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Labor and Employment
by Patrick L. Coyle*
and Alexandra V. Garrison"
Courts within the Eleventh Circuit handed down a number of
important opinions affecting labor and employment during the January
1, 2011 to December 31, 2011 survey period.' The following is a
discussion of those opinions.
I.

LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT

In Jim Walter Resources, Inc. v. United Mine Workers ofAmerica, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed a
district court order that required an Alabama coal mining company to
arbitrate its claim that the United Mine Workers and four local unions
engaged in work stoppages in violation of a collective bargaining
agreement, remanding the matter to the district court.' In so doing, the
court rejected the expansive approach applied by the Second, Third, and
Fourth Circuits (on which the district court had, in part, relied), which
required arbitration in cases where a collective bargaining agreement
reflected a general commitment to arbitration. Instead, the court in
Jim Walter Resources held that parties to a collective bargaining
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2004). Member, State Bars of Georgia and South Carolina.
** Associate in the firm of Alston & Bird LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Dartmouth College
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1. For an analysis of Eleventh Circuit labor and employment law during the prior
survey period, see Patrick L. Coyle & Alexandra V. Garrison, Labor and Employment,
Eleventh Circuit Survey, 62 MERCER L. REv. 1199 (2011).
2.
3.

663 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1328.

4. Id. at 1327-28.
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agreement were only required to arbitrate disputes contemplated by the
arbitration clause of the agreement.s
Jim Walter Resources, Inc. (Jim Walter) owned and operated coal
mining properties and other facilities in Alabama, and its employees
were represented by the United Mine Workers and its four local unions
(the Union).6 According to the collective bargaining agreement between
Jim Walter and the Union, the United Mine Workers "may designate
memorial periods not exceeding a total of ten (10) days during the term
of this Agreement at any mine or operation provided it shall give
reasonable notice to the Employer."' The parties also entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding which stated, in part, that, "[tihe
memorial period will be designated for legitimate reasons."
In October 2008, the Union observed two memorial periods away from
work at Jim Walter mines. Jim Walter determined that these work
stoppages were not "legitimate" memorial periods as provided in the
Memorandum of Understanding.o The Union disagreed, contending
that the work stoppages were proper memorial periods that allowed its
members to attend local hearings conducted by the Department of Labor,
Mine Safety and Health Administration. Jim Walter countered that the
Union's proffered explanation for the work stoppages was pretextual,
asserting that the actual motivation stemmed from a workplace dispute
regarding work scheduling and other conflicts with Jim Walter's
Industrial Relations Supervisor." Consequently, Jim Walter filed suit
under the Labor Management Relations Act' 2 in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, requesting a
declaratory judgment (1) "'that the dispute between the parties
[regarding the memorial periods] is subject to the (contractual]
arbitration procedure'; and (2) an award of damages 'for these illegal
work stoppages.'""' The Union moved for summary judgment, arguing

5. Id. at 1328.
6. Id. at 1323.
7. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
8. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
9. Id.
10. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
11. Id.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2006). Section 185 of the Labor Management Relations Act
provides in part that "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce .. . may be brought
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties."
13. Jim Walter Res., Inc., 663 F.3d at 1323 n.4 (second alteration in original) (noting
that "(ilt is an irony of the case that Jim Walter depends upon the arbitration provisions
of the contract from which to infer a no strike obligation on the part of the Union (i.e., that
the employees at Mine No. 7 should have grieved and sought arbitration of their disputes)
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that the collective bargaining agreement required Jim Walter to
arbitrate its claims rather than pursue a lawsuit in federal court. 4
The collective bargaining agreement between Jim Walter and the
Union contained dispute resolution procedures under Article XXVII that
provided for the resolution of disputes and claims in accordance with the
"machinery provided in the 'Settlement of Disputes' Article of this
Agreement ...

and by collective bargaining without recourse to the

courts.""
The "Settlement of Disputes" section of the agreement
(Article XXIII) contained an employee grievance procedure requiring the
resolution of disputes through arbitration. Other provisions in the
agreement discussed arbitration in the context of disputes stemming
from employee complaints and relating to the employee-oriented
grievance system.16
The Union argued that Jim Walter's claim for damages was subject to
arbitration because Article XXVII of the collective bargaining agreement
reflected the parties' intent "to resolve all disputes and claims ...
without recourse to the courts."
Jim Walter, however, argued that
Article XXIII, governing Settlement of Disputes, applied only to
employee-related disputes and claims and that the agreement did not
"contemplate or provide for any claim or grievance, or the arbitration of
any claim or grievance, asserted by the employer."s
In reaching its decision that the collective bargaining agreement's
arbitration provisions did not apply to Jim Walter's damages claim, the
Eleventh Circuit relied on several Supreme Court decisions, precedent
from the former Fifth Circuit, and the First, Third, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits.19 First, the court noted that the 1960 cases known as the
Steelworkers Trilogy2 0 established several basic principles governing the
application of arbitration provisions contained in collective bargaining
agreements, including the principles that "arbitration is a matter of
contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any

while contending that the Company has no reciprocal contractual obligation to arbitrate
its claim for damages").
14. Id. at 1323-24; see also Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment at 19-20, Jim Walter Res., Inc. v. United Mine Workers of Am. Int'l
Union, No. 7:08-CV-02033 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 5, 2009).
15. Jim Walter Res., Inc., 663 F.3d at 1324.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1325 (internal quotation marks omitted).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1325-28.
20. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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dispute which he has not agreed so to submit" and if the contract
contains an arbitration clause, a presumption of arbitrability exists, and
"[d]oubts should be resolved in favor of coverage." 21
Next, the court analyzed two United States Supreme Court cases,
Atkinson v. SinclairRefining Co. 22 and Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50,
2
American Bakery & Confectionery Workers International,' both of
which involved employers that had filed damages lawsuits against the
respective unions representing their employees for violating a "no strike
clause" in the respective collective bargaining agreements.2 ' Although
both cases involved collective bargaining agreements that contained
arbitration clauses, the Supreme Court found that only one of the
agreements (the one in Drake Bakeries) allowed for arbitration of that
particular employer/union dispute." What was the difference? In
Drake Bakeries, the grievance procedure in the bargaining agreement
contemplated arbitrability of both union and employer grievances.26
The contract in Atkinson, however, contained an employee grievance
procedure that was tailored specifically to the adjudication of employee
grievances." Like the employee grievance procedure in Atkinson, the
grievance procedure in Jim Walter was narrowly tailored to employee
grievances.28
The court also considered its own prior precedent and that of four
other circuits in concluding that the instant dispute was not arbitrable.29 In Firestone 7re & Rubber Co. v. InternationalUnion of United
Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of America"o and Friedrich
v. Local Union No. 780," the former Fifth Circuit considered the same
issue presented in the instant case (albeit with different agreements).
In both cases, the former Fifth Circuit held that the employer was not
required to arbitrate a claim for damages resulting from an alleged
breach of a "no strike clause" where "the contractual grievance machin-

21. Jim Walter Res., Inc., 663 F.3d at 1325-26 (quoting Warrior& Gulf NavigationCo.,
363 U.S. at 582-83).
22. 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
23. 370 U.S. 254 (1962).
24. Jim Walter Res., Inc., 663 F.3d at 1326.
25. Id.
26. Id. (citing Drake, 370 U.S. at 257).
27. Id. (citing Atkinson, 370 U.S. at 249).
28. See id. at 1328.
29. Id. at 1327.
30. 476 F.2d 603 (5th Cir. 1973).
31. 515 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1975).
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ery is wholly employee oriented."" Further, the court in Jim Walter
Resources acknowledged that courts of appeal in the First, Third,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits reached the same result when interpreting
collective bargaining agreements containing employee grievance and
arbitration clauses.'
The court observed, however, that other federal circuits had taken a
different approach to arbitration clauses in collective bargaining
agreements.' Decisions from the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits
applied a presumption of arbitrability in cases where a collective
bargaining agreement expressed a general commitment to arbitrating
disputes.s Those cases concluded that if the parties intended to
exclude employer initiated claims or disputes from arbitration, they
could have and should have specifically said so in the contracts.
Indeed, the district court in Jim Walter Resources relied on the Second
Circuit decision in ITT World Communications, Inc. v. Communications
Workers of America" to conclude that Jim Walter must arbitrate its
claims.38

ITT World Communications involved contractual provisions very
similar to the ones in Jim Walter Resources. There, the Second Circuit
stressed that "an order to arbitrate a labor contract dispute should not
be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the
arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the
asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage."39
Rather than following ITT World Communications and affirming the
district court's decision, however, the Eleventh Circuit chose to follow the
precedent established by the former Fifth Circuit in Firestone Tire &

32. Jim Walter Res., Inc., 663 F.3d at 1327 (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 476
F.2d at 605 and Friedrich, 515 F.2d at 227, 230).
33. Id. See Gen. Truck Drivers, Office, Food & Warehouse Union, 353 F.3d 668 (9th
Cir. 2003); Lehigh Portland Cement Co. v. Cement, Lime, Gypsum & Allied Workers Div.,
849 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1988); Latas Libby's Inc. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 609 F.2d 25
(1st Cir. 1979); Faultless Div. v. Local Lodge No. 2040 of Dist. 153 Intl Ass'n of Machinists
& Aerospace Workers, 513 F.2d 987 (7th Cir. 1975); G.T. Schjeldahl Co., Packaging Mach.
Div. v. Dist. Lodge No. 64, 393 F.2d 502 (1st Cir. 1968); Boeing Co. v. Int'l Union, 370 F.2d
969 (3d Cir. 1967).
34. Jim Walter Res., Inc., 663 F.3d at 1327.
35. Id.; see Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392, 10 F.3d 1064 (4th
Cir. 1993); Eberle Tanning Co. v. Section 63L, FLM Joint Bd., 682 F.2d 430 (3d Cir. 1982);
H.K. Porter Co. v. Local 37, United Steelworkers of Am., 400 F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1968).
36. Jim Walter Res., Inc., 663 F.3d at 1327.
37. 422 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1970).
38. Jim Walter Res., Inc., 663 F.3d at 1327.
39. Id. (quoting Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582-83).

1314

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

40 In fact, in declining to follow the
Rubber Company and Friedrich.
Second Circuit, the court noted that the Supreme Court recently
criticized the approach in ITT World Communications.
In Jim Walter Resources, the Eleventh Circuit ultimately concluded
that "the employee oriented grievance machinery in the parties' contract
qualifies and limits the universe of claims and grievances subject to
arbitration, and the language negates the intention that the employer's
claim for damages must be submitted to arbitration."'4 2 The court
reinforced that parties are required to arbitrate disputes only that they
specifically contemplated arbitrating in the bargaining agreement. By
so holding, the court rejected the more expansive approach applied by
the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits. The holding in Jim Walter
Resources clarifies the law in the Eleventh Circuit, confirming that in
the absence of a provision in a collective bargaining agreement
specifically requiring that a claim be arbitrated, it may be litigated. To
the extent employers and unions have understood the general provisions
that all doubts should be resolved in favor of arbitration and have
broadly interpreted the arbitration clauses in their arbitration agreements, Jim Walter Resources could furnish a strong argument that the
arbitration clause is limited in application to only those types of claims
specified in the agreement. More specifically, if the agreement was
drafted similarly to the agreement in Jim Walter Resources, employers
may have the right to commence litigation that employees would be
required to arbitrate under the plain terms of the agreement. Given this
development in Eleventh Circuit law, parties may wish to include more
explicit provisions in their collective bargaining agreements regarding
the types of claims that must be arbitrated.

II. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
Through Versiglio v. Board of Dental Examiners of Alabama, the
Eleventh Circuit demonstrated its deference to state court determina-

40. Id. at 1328.
41. Id. In GraniteRock Co. v. InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters, the Supreme
Court explained as follows:
Although Warrior & Gulf contains language that might in isolation be misconstrued as establishing a presumption that labor disputes are arbitrable whenever
they are not expressly excluded from an arbitration clause, the opinion elsewhere
emphasizes that even in LMRA cases, "courts" must construe arbitration clauses
because "a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he
has not agreed so to submit."
130 S. Ct. 2847, 2859 (2010).
42. Jim Walter Res., Inc., 663 F.3d 1328.
43. 651 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2011).
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tions of state agencies' sovereign immunity, even when an analysis of
sovereign immunity under Eleventh Circuit precedent would support the
The
opposite conclusion from the one the state court reached."
Eleventh Circuit in Versiglio relied on a previous state appellate court
ruling that Alabama's Board of Dental Examiners (the board) is not an
arm of the state, refusing to grant the board sovereign immunity from
a federal overtime wage suit brought under the Fair Labor Standards
Act (the FLSA)." The court affirmed the district court's decision,
finding that the board is not an arm of the state and denying the board
immunity from suit.4 6
In her complaint filed in the Northern District of Alabama, the
plaintiff Natalie Versiglio claimed that the board, a "quasi-state agency
for the State of Alabama," violated the FLSA by failing to pay her
overtime for time worked in excess of forty hours per week."7 Versiglio
alleged that in her role as an administrative assistant, she was typically
required to work more than forty hours each week, and that in lieu of
overtime pay, she received one hour of "comp time" (paid leave) for each
Versiglio further contended that
hour worked over forty per week.
of "comp time" during her
amount
a
significant
she accumulated
was not paid upon the
she
for
which
board
the
employment with
4
The
board filed a motion to
'
employment.
termination of her board
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that it had
sovereign immunity from lawsuits for money damages brought pursuant
to section 16(b) of the FLSA.o The district court denied the motion,
and the Board appealed."
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis of the board's position that it
was immune from damages claims under section 16(b) of the FLSA by
acknowledging that "Eleventh Amendment immunity bars suits brought
in federal court when the State itself is sued and when an arm of the

44. Id. at 1277.
45. Id.; Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006).
46. Versiglio, 651 F.3d at 1277.
47. Complaint of Plaintiff at 1, 4-5, Versigio v. Bd. of Dental Examiners of Ala., No.
2:10-cv-01850-WMA (N.D. Ala. July 12, 2010).
48. Id. at 3.
49. Id.
50. Motion to Dismiss of Defendant, Versiglio v. Bd. of Dental Examiners of Ala., No.
2:10-cv-01850-WMA (N.D. Ala. July 12, 2010); see 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) ("Any employer who
violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of this title shall be liable to the
employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their
unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as
liquidated damages.").
51. Versiglio, 651 F.3d at 1272.
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State is sued."52 However, whether an agency such as the Board of
Dental Examiners qualifies as an arm of the state is a federal question
determined by a federal standard, and this federal question "can be
answered only after considering the provisions of state law that define
the agency's character."
The four part test established in Miccosukee ribe of Indians v.
Florida State Athletic Commission54 guided the court's analysis
regarding whether state law established the board as an arm of the state
immune from the FLSA's requirements. In Miccosukee, the Eleventh
Circuit explained that,
[iln determining whether the Eleventh Amendment provides immunity
to a particular entity, this court examines the following factors: (1)how
state law defines the entity; (2) what degree of control the state
maintains over the entity; (3) where the entity derives its funds; and
(4) who is responsible for judgments against the entity.
In Versiglio, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed each of these factors in turn
to determine whether the board was entitled to sovereign immunity."
With respect to the first factor, the court determined that state law
defines the board in a manner that suggests it is an arm of the state."
When the Alabama state legislature created the board, it made findings
that "the practice of dentistry affects the public health, safety and
welfare and should be subject to regulation." The court in Versiglio
noted that these findings demonstrate that the legislature considered the
board to be an arm of the state."
Next, the court analyzed the amount of control the state of Alabama
maintained over the board.6 0 This factor also weighed in favor of a
finding of immunity. Here, the court observed that although the board
has some independence, the statutory scheme that created the board
allows the state to maintain control over its operations.6' Section 34-9-

52. Id. at 1273 (quoting Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003)).
53. Id. (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 n.5 (1997)).
54. 226 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 2000).
55. Versiglio, 651 F.3d at 1273-74 (quoting Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 226 F.3d at
1231).
56. Id. at 1274-76.
57. Id. at 1274.
58. Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also ALA. CODE§ 34-9-2(a), (c) (2012), available
at http-J/alisondb.legislature.state.al.us/acas/ACASLoginie.asp.
59. Versiglio, 651 F.3d at 1274.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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43 of the Alabama Code62 grants the board power to impose certain
rules and regulations, but the Code, not the board, outlines the specific
powers and duties that the board must exercise." In contrast, the
board maintains independence in appointing its members; the state does
The Code, however, does establish detailed
not select the board.'
guidelines regarding the selection of board members."
Third, the Court examined the source of the board'sfiinds and its
ability to spend those funds at its discretion." Although the board
obtains its funds from licensing fees and can spend its money at its own
discretion, the Code explains, "[a] 11 money, including license fees, annual
renewal license certificate fees, examination fees and any and all other
fees and receipts . . . are hereby appropriated to the Board of Dental

Examiners to be used as herein provided."" Indeed, the board is able
to collect licensing fees because the state grants the board this power
through Alabama Code § 34-9-41.6e Further, the board does not have
complete discretion to spend its funds. Instead, the Code only authorizes
the board to
expend such funds as shall be necessary to enforce the provisions of
this chapter; to pay salaries, expenses and other costs herein provided;
to promote the arts and science of dentistry; and for such other
purposes as the board shall consider to be in the best interest of
dentistry in this state.69
With respect to this factor, the court found that the board's funds were
state funds which weighed in favor of finding immunity."o
The fourth factor was whether the state would be responsible for a
judgment against the agency. The court concluded that if the plaintiff's
lawsuit were permitted to continue, the State of Alabama would

62. ALA. CODE § 34-9-43, available at http://alisondb.legislature.state.al.us/acas/
ACASLoginie.asp.
63. Versiglio, 651 F.3d at 1274; see also ALA. CODE § 34-9-43.
64. Versiglio, 651 F.3d at 1275.
65. Id.; see ALA. CODE § 34-9-40, availableat http://alisondb.legislature.state.al.us/acas
/ACASLoginie.asp.
66. Versiglio, 651 F.3d at 1275.
67. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); ALA. CODE § 34-9-41, available at
http://alisondb.legislature.state.al.us/acas/ACASLoginie.asp.
68. Versiglio, 651 F.3d at 1275; see ALA. CODE § 34-9-41.
69. Versiglio, 651 F.3d at 1275 (internal quotation marks omitted); ALA. CODE § 34-941.
70. Versiglio, 651 F.3d at 1275.

1318

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

ultimately be responsible for any judgment entered against the board.n
Hence, this factor also weighed in favor of a finding of immunity.72
Although the court concluded that the board presented a potentially
viable defense of sovereign immunity under the Miccosukee test, the
court looked beyond the Miccosukee factors in reaching a determination
that the board was not immune from suit.73 The Court looked to state
court precedent to see if the highest state court in Alabama had
On
determined whether the agency was immune from suit or not.
board's
the
analyzed
Appeals
of
Civil
Court
Alabama
the
2010,
April 1,
status as a state agency in Wilkinson v. Board of Dental Examiners of
Alabama." In that case, the board argued that it was immune from
suit under Article 1, Section 14 of the Alabama Constitution, which
provides that "the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in
any court of law or equity."76 Applying the state's test for entities
seeking immunity, the Court of Civil Appeals concluded that the board
was not an arm of the state and accordingly was not entitled to
immunity under section 14.
The Eleventh Circuit in Versiglio observed that finding the board to
be entitled to sovereign immunity from suits for overtime pay under the
FLSA would require the court to construe Alabama law in a manner that
is squarely at odds with the ruling of the highest state court to address
Further, reaching such a conclusion would create an
the issue."
inconsistency where a state agency would be immune from suit under
federal law, but not state law.79 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that it would be inappropriate to hold that the board is an
arm of the state receiving sovereign immunity.8 o
While the analysis in Versiglio primarily focuses on whether the board
satisfied the criteria to be considered an arm of the state under
Miccosukee, the fact that the board would likely have been considered an
arm of the state under that test did not matter in this instance because
the highest state court in Alabama to address the issue had reached a
different conclusion. Accordingly, Versiglio amplifies the significance of
a state court's ruling that an agency is not protected by sovereign

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1276-77.
No. 2100175, 2011 WL 1205669 (Ala. Civ. App. Apr. 1, 2011).
Id. at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also ALA. CONST. art. I, § 14.
Wilkinson, 2011 WL 1205669, at *5.
Versiglio, 651 F.3d at 1277.
Id.
Id.
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immunity; if that court is the highest in the state to address the issue,
Versiglio suggests that the Eleventh Circuit will likely defer to that
court's determination in relation to sovereign immunity, even applying
that holding to liability under federal statutes. This mitigates the
significance of the Miccosukee test and increases the potential liability
to which the state agency could be exposed to include federal claims
(including, but not necessarily limited to claims arising under the
FLSA).
In Clincy v. Galardi South Enterprises," the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia decided whether exotic
dancers/entertainers at Club Onyx in Atlanta, Georgia, were independent contractors or employees. 82 Discovery in the case was bifurcated,
with the first phase addressing whether the plaintiffs, former and
current entertainers at Onyx, were independent contractors or employees. The plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment arguing
they were employees entitled to receive the minimum wage in accordance with the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The court ultimately
granted partial summary judgment to the entertainers, finding that the
application of the economic realities test revealed that the entertainers
were employees of Club Onyx."
The plaintiffs argued that "[clourts determine whether an employer/employee relationship exists by examining the economic realities of
the relationship between the putative employee and putative employer."8
The defendants, the owners of Onyx, argued in their own
summary judgment motion that each plaintiff had to establish that she
was a "putative employee" before the court could examine the economic
reality of the relationship between the parties." The court rejected the
defendants' argument and denied them summary judgment, noting that
the defendants failed to support their contention with any binding case
law requiring that an antecedent determination be made prior to
employing the economic realities test."
In addressing the economic realities test, the court explained that
several factors apply in determining whether an individual is an
independent contractor or an employee:
(1) the nature and degree of the alleged employer's control as to the
manner in which the work is to be performed; (2) the alleged employ81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

808 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2011).
Id. at 1328.
Id. at 1328, 1345.
Id. at 1338 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1339.
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ee's opportunity for profit or loss depending upon his managerial skill;
(3) the alleged employee's investment in equipment or materials
required for his [or her] task, or his [or her] employment of [other]
workers; (4) whether the service rendered requires a special skill; (5)
the degree of permanency and duration of the working relationship;
[and] (6) the extent to which the service rendered is an integral part
of the alleged employer's business."
"No one factor is determinative, and each factor should be given weight
according to how much light it sheds on the nature of the economic
Before
dependence of the putative employee on the employer.""8
applying each of these factors to the case at hand, the court observed
that several other courts that had addressed the question had found that
exotic dancers were employees entitled to minimum wage payments by
the nightclubs where they worked.8"
The court examined each factor of the economic realities test in turn,
beginning with the nature and degree of control exercised by Onyx."o
The plaintiffs and defendants disagreed about how much control Onyx
imposed on the dancers. The plaintiffs asserted as follows:
Defendants' control over entertainers' work starts from the moment an
entertainer is hired, carries through nearly every aspect of work until
employment is terminated, and dictates the most meaningful aspects
of an entertainers' work such as how entertainers should look, exactly
when and how entertainers will remove their clothing, when and how
they will dance, and how much they will charge for their services."
By contrast, the defendants contended as follows:
The evidence in this case shows that [pilaintiffs, not Club Onyx, control
the most meaningful parts of their dancing careers: when and how they
dance, for whom they perform, their appearance, their income, manner
of dance, and when they come-and-go from the [cilub. The few
conditions identified by [pilaintiffs as beyond their control are also

87. Id. at 1343.
88. Id. (quoting Perdomo v. Ask 4 Realty & Mgmt., Inc., 298 F. App'x 820, 821 (11th
Cir. 2008)).
89. Id.; see Reich v. Circle C. Invs., Inc., 998 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding dancers
are employees under the FLSA); Reich v. Priba Corp., 890 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Tex. 1995)

(same); Martin v. Priba Corp., No. 3:91-CV-2786-G, 1992 WL 486911 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 6,
1992) (same).
90. Clincy, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 1343.
91. Id.
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beyond Club Onyx's complete control, and are mandated not by the
[club itself, but instead by State law and municipal ordinance. 2
The court found that the defendants' arguments were unavailing, citing
another district court in the Eleventh Circuit which noted that
[the mere fact that [the club] has delegated a measure of discretion to
its dancers does not necessarily mean that its dancers are elevated to
the status of independent contractors. . . . The question this Court
must resolve is whether a . .. dancer's freedom to work when she

wants and for whomever she wants reflects economic independence, or
whether these freedoms merely mask the economic reality of dependence.'
The court in Clincy also reviewed the various manners in which the
defendants exercised control over the plaintiffs' employment.9 4 First,
the defendants required that each entertainer obtain an individual adult
entertainment license specific to Onyx from the City of Atlanta." After
the entertainers obtained their licenses, the defendants gave each
entertainer a packet containing rules regarding scheduling, conduct
related to dancing on stage, dress and appearance, and the cost of tableside and VIP dances.96 Further, Onyx's management had the authority
to fine or discipline entertainers who failed to comply with the rules, and
had actually done so." Consequently, the court concluded that the
defendants exercised a significant amount of control over the entertainers, weighing in favor of finding an employer-employee relationship."
Next, the court addressed the plaintiffs' opportunity to profit from
their work as entertainers at Onyx." The court rejected the defendants' argument that the plaintiffs' opportunity for profit stemmed from
their own initiative with respect to how often they elected to work, their
conduct at work, and advertising, marketing, and promotion. 0
Indeed, the court noted that it was "not aware of any decision in which
92. Id. at 1343-44 (noting that the defendants explained that the State of Georgia and
City of Atlanta "control what types of activities can and cannot occur in the Club; control
which permits and licenses dancers and club owners must have; control what hours the
Club can legally be open for business; and impose a duty to reasonably monitor
entertainers, such that they do not drive away from the Club intoxicated").
93. Id. at 1344 (second alteration in original) (quoting Harrell v. Diamond A Entm't,
Inc., 992 F. Supp. 1343, 1349 (M.D. Fla. 1997)).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1330.
96. Id. at 1344.
97. Id. at 1345.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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a court found that an exotic dancer has significant control over her
opportunity for profit or loss relative to the club at which she works.
Several courts, however, have rejected this argument.""o' The court
also noted that the defendants-not the entertainers-maintained the
primary responsibility of advertising, marketing, and promoting the club
to customers and made decisions with respect to the club's location,
maintenance, aesthetics, atmosphere, and availability and pricing of food
and alcohol."' Although there were nights that entertainers incurred
a net loss as a result of fees and fines paid to the club, the risk of loss
was significantly greater for the club than for the entertainers. 0 3 The
court found that this factor weighed in favor of finding the existence of
an employer-employee relationship. 10 4
The court next analyzed the relative investment factor of the economic
realities test and rejected the defendants' argument that the entertainers
bore a greater investment in exotic dancing than the defendants.'0 5
Without citing any supporting authority, the defendants contended as
follows:
[Tihe [cilub's only direct investment in [the entertainers'] exotic
dancing work are the stage and poles on which they dance ....

The

remaining investments, for facilities, maintenance, repairs, liquor
licenses, and food would exist whether or not Plaintiffs performed at
Club Onyx, [and therefore,] should not be considered in the Court's
analysis of the parties' relevant degree of investment.10 6
The court found this argument to be unavailing and noted that other
courts addressing this factor rejected the same argument.o' Indeed,
while Club Onyx spent approximately $900,000 each year between 2007
and 2009 on equipment, fixtures, improvements, insurance, rent,
marketing, maintenance and repair, alcohol, licenses, and music, the
entertainers spent between $14,000 and $50,000 on expenses related to
hair, costumes, props, shoes, makeup, nails, and personal grooming. 08

101. Id. (citing Circle C. Invs., 998 F.2d at 328).
102. Id. at 1346.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. (third alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. Id. at 1346-47 (quoting PribaCorp., 890 F. Supp. at 593) ("Entertainers at the club
make no investment in its facilities or atmosphere aside from choosing what clothing to
wear when performing. All investment and risk capital is provided by defendants. Indeed,
but for defendants' provision of the lavish work environment, the entertainers at the club
likely would earn nothing.").
108. Id. at 1347.
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Accordingly, the court found that the entertainers' investment in exotic
dancing was less than the defendants' investment in the club, weighing
in favor of finding an employer-employee relationship. 09
Turning to the fourth factor regarding the necessity of a special skill,
the court concluded that special skills were not required to perform at
Onyx because although the defendants preferred dancers with previous
exotic dancing experience, it was not a prerequisite for employment as
an entertainer at the club.1 o Accordingly, the court determined that
this factor weighed in favor of finding an employer-employee relationship."
With respect to the permanency of the working relationship between
the entertainers and the club, the court could not conclude whether this
factor weighed in favor of finding an employer-employee relationship."' Although the plaintiffs had previously contended, and other
courts have found that exotic entertainers tend to be "transient or
itinerant," at least eleven of the plaintiffs in the action and ten other
entertainers who were not parties to the action had working relationships with the club exceeding one year.'
The court concluded that
reasonable jurors could reach different conclusions about this factor and
declined to state whether this factor weighs in favor of an employeremployee relationship."'
Lastly, regarding whether exotic dancing was integral to the defendants' business, the court rejected the defendants' argument that "[n]ude
dancing, while also contributing to the [c]lub's cach4, is not it's [sic]
essential function."" 5 The court agreed with the plaintiffs assertion
that the defendants' argument is "absurd," because based on the record,
a reasonable juror could not find that the role of nude entertainers at
the club is not integral to its business."'
The court rejected the defendants' additional argument that because
several of the plaintiffs elected to be treated as independent contractors
reported to the IRS that they were independent contractors, and because
each entertainer must obtain an individual permit from the City of
Atlanta to perform, the economic reality tilts in favor of finding that the

109. Id.

110. Id.
111. Id. at 1348.
112. Id.
113.
114.

Id.
Id.

115. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. Id. at 1349 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, the club's night manager
testified that "[glirls make the club busy. As far as if you don't have enough girls in the
building, your customers won't stay. . . ." Id. (alteration in original).
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plaintiffs were independent contractors."' The court noted that "[iun
deciding whether an individual is an 'employee' within the meaning of
the FLSA, the label attached to the relationship is dispositive only to the
degree it mirrors the economic reality of the relationship.""' Hence,
even though some of the plaintiffs reported to the IRS that they were
independent contractors, the court refused to allow the club to treat
them as non-employees for FLSA liability."'
The court concluded its analysis by examining the entire record and
evaluating all of the factors in the economic realities test, noting that
Ultimately, the court concluded
"[nlo one factor is determinative."'
that the plaintiffs should have been classified as employees under the
FLSA based on "the [club's degree of control over the work of entertainers, the entertainers' opportunity for profit and loss, the entertainers'
relative investment, the lack of specialized skill required to be an
entertainer, and the integral nature of nude entertainment to the [c]lub's
business . . . ."12 This decision is significant not only for clarifying the
employee/independent contractor status of dancers in the adult
entertainment industry in the Eleventh Circuit, but also in showing that
the court will disregard how other independent contractors have been
classified (and even how they classify themselves to the IRS) if the
economic realities confirm that they should be treated as employees for
liability for minimum wages and overtime under the FLSA.
III.

EMPLOYEE POLYGRAPH PROTECTION ACT AND THE CONSOLIDATED
OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT

In Cummings v. Washington Mutual,'22 the Eleventh Circuit decided
two important issues related to the Employee Polygraph Protection Act
(EPPA)"' and the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(COBRA)124 in August 2011. First, the court concluded that a violation
of the EPPA did not exist where the plaintiff's employer requested that
the plaintiff submit to a polygraph test in connection with an "ongoing
investigation" of a specific incident in which the employer had a

117. Id.
118. Id. (quoting Donovan v. Tehco, Inc., 642 F.2d 141, 143 (5th Cir. 1981)).

119. Id.
120. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Perdomo v. Ask 4 Realty & Mgmt., Inc., 298
F. App'x 820, 821 (11th Cir. 2008)).
121. Id. at 1350.
122. 650 F.3d 1386 (11th Cir. 2011).
123. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (2006).
124. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1169 (2006).
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"reasonable suspicion" that the plaintiff was involved." Second, and
more significantly, the court concluded that "a COBRA improper-notice
claim accrues when the plaintiff either knows or should know the facts
necessary to bring an improper-notice claim: specifically, that his former
employer has failed to provide him with the required notice of his
continuation right."126 Critically, this holding opens the door to
plaintiffs bringing viable COBRA improper-notice claims years after the
statute of limitations has run for such claims.
Dave Cummings worked as the manager of defendant Washington
Mutual's Piedmont Commons branch between January 2006 and
December 2006 before transferring to become the manager at another
branch. In February 2007, the new manager at the Piedmont Commons
branch conducted a cash audit that revealed a cash shortage of
approximately $58,000. The money was missing from two Teller Cash
Dispenser machines that Cummings had access to while he worked at
the branch. Washington Mutual sent two fraud investigators to the
branch to review surveillance camera still images and interview
witnesses. The surveillance camera still images appeared to show
Cummings and his employees repeatedly violating Washington Mutual's
Dual Control Policy which required that two people be present when
cash is handled or when secure areas are accessed. Additionally, several
current and former employees of the Piedmont Commons branch
informed the investigators that Cummings repeatedly violated the Dual
Control Policy when he worked as branch manager. The investigators
also interviewed Cummings and asked if he would submit to a polygraph
test. Cummings, however, declined to do so. On March 19, 2007,
Washington Mutual terminated Cummings's employment because of his
violations of the Dual Control Policy, not because he declined to take a
polygraph test.127
After Cummings's termination, Washington Mutual sent Cummings
a notice required by COBRA informing Cummings of his right to
continue his employer-provided health insurance coverage for a period
of time after his discharge. Cummings contended that he never received
the notice, his insurance was canceled, and he incurred over $2,000 in
medical expenses on behalf of his wife. Cummings later filed a
complaint against Washington Mutual with the Department of Labor
(DOL) alleging that Washington Mutual violated the EPPA. The DOL
informed Cummings that his claims could not be confirmed, and he
subsequently filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the
125. Cummings, 650 F.3d at 1390.
126. Id. at 1391.
127. Id. at 1388.
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Northern District of Georgia, restating his EPPA claims and alleging
that Washington Mutual violated COBRA by failing to inform him of his
right to continue his healthcare coverage. The trial court granted
summary judgment on both claims to Washington Mutual, and
Cummings appealed. In his appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, Cummings
challenged the district court's ruling in favor of Washington Mutual on
his EPPA and COBRA claimS.128
With respect to Cummings's first claim, under the EPPA, an employer
usually cannot "require, request, suggest, or cause any employee .

.

. to

take or submit to any lie detector test."'29 An employer can, however,
request that an employee take a polygraph test in four circumstances:
(1) the test is administered in connection with an ongoing investigation involving economic loss or injury to the employer's business .. .;
(2) the employee had access to the property that is the subject of the
investigation; (3) the employer has a reasonable suspicion that the
employee was involved in the incident or activity under investigation;
and (4) the employer executes a statement, provided to the examinee
before the test, that [is signed and that describes with particularity the
employee's alleged misconduct and the basis for the employer's
reasonable suspicion] ."O

Cummings only challenged the district court's conclusions that an
"ongoing investigation" existed and that Washington Mutual had a
"reasonable suspicion" that Cummings violated the Dual Control
Policy. 3 1
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court, concluding that
Washington Mutual was investigating the disappearance of $58,000 from
the Piedmont Commons branch during Cummings's tenure as manager
of the branch.'3 2 The court also found that the regulations to the
EPPA do not require employers to have conclusive evidence of loss or
injury before requesting or administering a polygraph test. 33 Instead,
the "regulations require only 'additional evidence' suggesting that the
employee in question 'was involved in the incident.""' Here, Washington Mutual had obtained surveillance camera images and testimony
from witnesses about Cummings's violations of the Dual Control

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 1389.
Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 2002(1).
Cummings, 650 F.3d at 1389 (alteration in original); see also 29 U.S.C. § 2006(d).
Cummings, 650 F.3d at 1389 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1390.
Id.
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Therefore, Washington Mutual's polygraph request was
Policy.'
made in conjunction with an "ongoing investigation."1 36
Next, the court determined that Washington Mutual had a "reasonable
suspicion" that Cummings violated the Dual Control Policy."' The
regulations to the EPPA define reasonable suspicion as "an observable,
articulable basis in fact which indicates that a particular employee was
involved in, or responsible for, an economic loss."138 In support of its
finding that a reasonable suspicion existed, the court noted that only
four other employees had access to the area from which the money was
taken and that Cummings managed all four of them; Cummings and his
employees accessed money and secure areas in violation of the Dual
Control Policy; and Cummings's coworkers confirmed the evidence,
stating that Cummings repeatedly violated the policy.13 ' Accordingly,
Washington Mutual had a "reasonable suspicion" that Cummings was
involved in the incident under investigation.14 0 Thus, the court
affirmed the district court's entry of summary judgment for Washington
Mutual on Cummings's EPPA claim.'
With respect to Cummings's COBRA claim, the court evaluated
whether Cummings's claim that he did not receive proper notice of his
COBRA continuation right was timely filed.142 Under COBRA, an
employer must notify an employee of his right to continue healthcare
coverage through its healthcare administrator after the employee's
termination."14 The employer must notify the healthcare administrator
within thirty days of the employee's termination." Then, the administrator must notify the employee of his continuation right within
fourteen days.'
In this case, after Cummings's termination on March
19, 2007, Washington Mutual had until May 2, 2007, to notify Cummings of his continuation right."
A one-year statute of limitations period exists with respect to COBRA
improper-notice claims, and Cummings and Washington Mutual

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); 29 C.F.R. § 801.12(f)(1) (2011).
Cummings, 650 F.3d at 1390.
Id.
Id. at 1392.
Id. at 1391.
Id. at 1390; 29 U.S.C. § 1163(2).
Cummings, 650 F.3d at 1390; 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(2).
Cummings, 650 F.3d at 1390; 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(4)(A), (c).
Cummings, 650 F.3d at 1390.
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disagreed about when this limitations period began to run."' Cummings argued that his claim accrued when he discovered that Washington Mutual failed to notify him of his COBRA continuation right. Cummings claimed that he learned of this on March 20, 2008, during a
meeting with his lawyer. Washington Mutual, however, contended that
the limitations period began to run on May 3, 2007, the day its time for
notifying Cummings of his continuation right expired. Cummings filed
his lawsuit on July 24, 2008, within the one year limitations period if
the period began on March 20, 2008, but outside of the period if it began

on May 3, 2007.148
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis by explaining that in some
contexts, the court has applied a federal common law rule that a claim
accrues when a plaintiff either knows or should have known that he
suffered an injury.14 The court decided to apply this claim-accrual
rule to COBRA improper-notice claims, recognizing that the COBRA
notification requirement exists because employees are not expected to
know that their right to healthcare coverage continues after the end of
employment."s In this regard, the court noted that under Washington
Mutual's interpretation, starting the limitations period when the
notification period expires could result in the limitations period running
out before a plaintiff even knows that he or she has been injured.''
The court refused to adopt that rule and reversed the district court's
decision granting summary judgment for Washington Mutual, concluding
that the improper-notice claim accrues when the plaintiff either knows
or should have known that his employer failed to notify him of his
continuation right.5 2
Cummings clarifies what constitutes an "ongoing investigation" and
"reasonable suspicion" with respect to EPPA claims. More significantly,
however, by determining that COBRA improper-notice claims do not
accrue until an employee knows or should have known of the employer's
failure to notify, Cummings has the potential to expand indefinitely the
duration of an employer's liability for these claims. Indeed, the Eleventh
Circuit acknowledged "that this claim-accrual rule will permit plaintiffs
to go many years before discovering that their notification right has been
violated, and then to bring suit for non-disclosure penalties long after

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 1391.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the alleged failure of notification occurred."5 3 The court, however,
noted that the statutory remedy for COBRA notification violations is
"'up to $100 a day from the date of the notification failure and other
relief the court 'in its discretion .

.

. deems proper."""

Since the court

may decide the exact type and amount of relief, a plaintiff will not
automatically recover the statutory penalties for the entire period before
the lawsuit was filed."' Accordingly, even if a plaintiff asserts an
improper-notice claim years after the end of his or her employment, the
district court retains the discretion to limit the defendant's liability.5 6
Hence, while the court will not automatically grant a plaintiff $100 a
day in an improper-notice claim, employers and employees should
beware that the decision in Cummings opens the door to extensive
potential liability for these types of claims.

153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 1391 n.6.
Id. (alteration in original); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1).
Cummings, 650 F.3d at 1391 n.6.
Id.

